The Problem of Political Gerrymandering Recent political history in California illustrates the problem of political gerrymandering. In 2004 in California, every incumbent running for reelection to Congress or to the state legislature was elected, and no seats changed party hands. Although extreme, the results in California reflect a nationwide pattern. In the 2000 elections, 25 percent of incumbents in the House of Representatives ran virtually unopposed, and in 2004 scholars concluded that only 30 congressional races-most involving open seats--could be classified as competitive. The absence of meaningful choice for voters reflects a simple fact. In most states, state legislators draw up districts for both houses of the state legislature and for the House of Representatives; and armed with advanced computers and access to sophisticated political and ethnic databases, they can redistrict state legislatures and draw the boundaries of House districts to seek partisan advantage and to determine election outcomes. They also create "sweetheart" districts for incumbents, thereby ensuring that changes in public opinion do not result in significant legislative turnover. At one time it could be said that constituents chose their legislators. Today, the reality is that legislators are choosing their constituents, sometimes even in mid-decade. This pervasive legislative self-dealing has several detrimental effects. First, rigged districts undermine representative government. Voters can ensure accountability only if they have a meaningful choice among candidates, but districts with predetermined outcomes deprive voters of such choice. This frustrates voters and discourages political participation. It also encourages citizens to turn to other mechanisms for controlling legislators, such as term limits and the initiative. Second, partisan gerrymandering ensures that the make-up of legislatures fails to reflect fairly the partisan division within the electorate. In particular, gerrymandering means that the minority party typically wins fewer seats than would be expected based on its percentage of the total vote in the state. Third, districting abuses impede the flow of political talent into Congress and state legislatures, because districting that protects incumbents blocks opportunities for promising local leaders to run for office. And predetermined outcomes in legislative races make it difficult to recruit highly qualified opposition candidates. Finally, partisan gerrymandering encourages extreme partisanship and extreme positions. Safe seats mean that legislators do not have to seek the political middle, because their electoral prospects do not depend on support from independent voters and members of the opposing party. Rather, legislators and legislative candidates are driven to appeal to the most ideological members of their own parties, because those partisans turn out disproportionately in primaries, the only important races in a gerrymandered system.